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Abstract
Cyber terrorism is the new ever evolving enemy of our future. Its impact on
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which function within all
America’s physical and cyber infrastructure, is so complex and perilous critical action
must be taken. Over 75% of the world’s oil and gas pipelines are monitored and controlled
by SCADA systems (Lewis 229). Factor in that almost 78% of internet attacks are traced
overseas we must be aware of the 1.2 billion internet users worldwide (Verton). With over
5,000 airports, 3,000 government facilities, 104 commercial nuclear power plants, 5, 800
hospitals, 8,000 dams, and over 1,600 wastewater facilities we are all slaves to electrical
power and in turn, the reliability of our cyber infrastructure (Verton). However, our
biggest risk may lay in the fact that over 85% of our infrastructure is owned privately
where cost efficiency flies high above systematic security. In my study I conducted more
than ten interviews with high ranking government officials and also cyber security
analysts. The hypothesis that our physical and cyber infrastructure are in critical danger
was strongly supported by my research. Fundamentally, as technology continues to expand
and systematic security becomes more necessary we must be skeptical of those that find
solace in solely cost efficient initiatives.
Introduction
At issue in this paper is cyber terrorism and its impact on the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that function within all America’s physical and cyber
infrastructure. Over 75% of the world’s oil and gas pipelines are monitored and controlled by
SCADA systems (Lewis 229). Also more than 1,700 of our countries 2,800 power plants use
SCADA systems to run their electrical substations (Lewis 229). In the United States alone there
are a total of 170 million personal computers and of our population of 334 million people, 234
million are believed to be internet users (“Internet World Stats”). However, this figure does not
do justice to the true physical state of affairs. With almost 78% of Internet attacks being traced
overseas we must factor in the worlds over 1.2 billion internet users (Verton). With over 5,000
airports, 3,000 government facilities, 104 commercial nuclear power plants, 5, 800 hospitals,
8,000 dams, and over 1,600 wastewater facilities we are all slaves to electrical power and in turn,
the reliability of our cyber infrastructure (Verton). However, our biggest risk may lay in the fact
that over 85% of our infrastructure is owned privately where cost efficiency flies high above
systematic security. This becomes more problematic when companies, public and private, are
leaving open connections into these SCADA systems, just waiting for a hacker to do physical
and/or monetary harm.
The entire issue of cyber and SCADA security is impossible to encompass in one study
so I have based my research mainly on the government’s action, or perceived inaction, when it
comes to the threat of a cyber attack. This issue cannot be all encompassing because of the
statistics that I have just provided to you. However, I do believe that the government’s response

to the issue and the academic community’s belief in the threat is vital to the understanding of the
complicated matter of SCADA security.
Using in-depth interviews from high ranking government officials and academics in the
field of SCADA research and cyber security, I investigated the area of government involvement
very thoroughly. With the use of thousands of pages of text and articles I have been able to
gather a thoughtful representation of the true threat that our country faces with respect to the
safety of our critical infrastructure. However, before I lay out my research some definitions,
some definitions to this research must be given. I begin by defining terrorism and cyber
terrorism.
Defining Terrorism
To begin a study on terrorism one must first identify its origins and unearth the reasons
for its continued use. While the true origins of terrorism are unfeasible to identify many scientists
pinpoint their beginnings with the sicarii, a terrorist movement that began in the first century.
Walter Laqueur, a renowned terrorist expert, describes the sicarii as “a highly organized religious
sect consisting of men of lower orders active in the Zealot struggle in Palestine” (Laqueur 3).
While this organization did not bear the terrorist label at the time, its use of “unorthodox tactics
such as attacking their enemies by daylight, preferably on holidays when crowds congregated in
Jerusalem”, are methods used by today’s terrorists (Laqueur 3). Another highly influential
terrorist organization was the Assassins, “an offshoot of the Ismailis who appeared in the
eleventh century and were suppressed by the Mongols in the thirteenth” (Laqueur 4). This group
is intriguing to many terrorism scholars because the tactics that were used are very comparable to
the ones that are used by modern terrorists. In Laqueur’s book entitled, The History of Terrorism,
he stresses this relationship when he writes; “Their first urban victim was the chief minister of
the Sultan of Baghdad […] a Sunnite by religious persuasion and therefore an enemy” (Laqueur
8). While these attacks may have been common throughout the Middle Ages and beyond,
Laqueur outlines the lack of success these early groups experienced brilliantly when he writes,
“Despite the considerable violence in Europe during the Middle Ages,
and, even worse, during the religious wars of the sixteenth centuries, in
which monarchs as well as religious leaders were killed, there were no
sustained terrorist campaigns during this time” (Laqueur 5).
While these gruesome acts of terror were employed long before the 18th century it was not until
the French Revolution were the word terrorism came about. It would become highly relevant
from then on with the political and social disarray that came at the dawn of the 19th century.
Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert, describes this era as “a time of great national tension and
social ferment, witnessed the emergence of modern-what I call traditional-terrorism and guerrilla
warfare” (Hoffman 5). In a time of inequality where political change was nearly impossible to
produce from poor leftists, because of societal status, terrorism was seen as an effective way for
a small highly motivated group to enact large political change.
By definition, terrorism at its foundation is the employment of terror as a mode of
politics. Dan Verton, a journalist covering issues of terrorism and cyber security, writes,
“Terrorism…is a form of politics that strikes fear in the hearts and minds of people because of its
destructive power and its ability to wreak havoc and physical pain on unsuspecting innocent
people” (Verton XIX). Martha Crenshaw, a terrorism scholar, also provides a brilliant example
of the use of asymmetrical tactics used by terrorists when she writes, “Generally small
organizations resort to violence to compensate for what they lack in numbers” (Crenshaw 11).

Terrorism is a strikingly useful tool for small groups to wage asymmetric warfare to further their
influence on public policy. Essentially, many terrorists find it more useful to cause mass havoc in
the matter of minutes, with sometimes less than ideal planning, than to sit down and negotiate
diplomatically with the political opposition. However, as Crenshaw points out, terrorism is not
always the first choice of action by these sub-national groups. Crenshaw writes, “In the
Palestinian-Israeli struggle, terrorism followed the failure of Arab efforts at conventional warfare
against Israel” (Crenshaw 11). Fundamentally, the reason that sub-national groups use terrorism
is because they feel as though they can benefit from their terrorist activity, through free publicity
and also frightened political leaders that they hope will become more committed to listen to their
particular demands. However one may wonder why terrorists, who lack sufficient numbers, can
become so dangerous and influential. This is due to their elusiveness and also their erratic nature.
Crenshaw writes, “[…] the essential problem is when do extremist organizations find terrorism
useful”, and trying to determine the timeframe of this usefulness (Crenshaw 10). Terrorisms
effectiveness also lays in its lack of borders. Hoffman writes, “Toward the end of the nineteenth
century […] terrorist attacks took place in many places all over the globe” (Laqueur 12).
Ultimately, no state can completely protect themselves from terrorist activity, however it can
implement the proper policies that better prevent terrorism and also try and thwart the use of
terrorism as a way for small under funded radical groups to gain political power and undermine
the security of their nation.
Any political science scholar will tell you that terrorism is one of the most elusive terms
to define in all of the social sciences. David Whittaker, a retired international relations lecturer,
writes, “A troubled world, searching for consensus about the meaning of terrorism and how to
counter it, finds it impossible to frame a workable definition” (Whittaker 11). Laqueur, describes
terrorisms ambiguity best when he writes, “No definition of terrorism can possibly cover all the
varieties of terrorism that have appeared throughout history” (Laqueur 17). “The word terrorism
was first popularized during the French Revolution. “In contrast to its contemporary usage, at
that time terrorism had a decidedly positive connotation” (Hoffman 15). While terrorism grew
from very humble beginnings, at the turn of the 19th century it became used as a political tool to
better the plight of the poor and under represented. “Ironically, perhaps, terrorism in its original
context was closely associated with the ideals of virtue and democracy” (Hoffman 15).
However, during the late 19th century a new definition of terrorism unfolded. Carlo Pisacane, an
Italian revolutionary, outlined the use of terrorism as, “Violence […] necessary not only to draw
attention to, or generate publicity for, a cause, but to inform, educate and ultimately rally behind
the revolution” (Hoffman 17). This belief of terrorism as a revolutionary tool changed once again
by the 1930s. “It was now used less to refer to revolutionary movements […] and more to
describe practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their doctoral leaders
against their own citizens” (Hoffman 23). One of the most involved political terrorist movements
of this time were the gangs that Mussolini and Hitler hired to harass and intimidate political
opponents. While another shift took place after World War II, in the early 1980s with the rise of
terrorism in the Middle East on western targets terrorism found a new meaning once again.
Hoffman writes, “Terrorism thus became associated with a type of covert or surrogate warfare
whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals without the risk of
retribution” (Hoffman 27). The definition of terrorism cannot be easily defined, even by the
powerful bureaucracies of the United States. For example, different definitions exist in the
department of state, FBI, and defense department in the United States. For the purpose of my

research I will use a rather exhaustive definition by Grant Wardlaw, a senior criminologist who
writes,
Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual
or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority,
when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fearinducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with
the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands
of the perpetrators (Wardlaw 16).
While the definition of terrorism has continued to transform over the past two hundred
years so have the tactics and tools of the terrorists. With the birth of the atomic bomb and the
lethalness of new chemical and biological weapons it would be naive to believe that terrorists
will not have their best opportunities to cause mass destruction and terror in the coming years.
David Whittaker in his book, Terrorism Understanding the Global Threat, describes the
imminent threat we face when he writes, “It is not impossible that a dirty bomb…could be
assembled for use, perhaps, as a large car bomb” (Whittaker 174). While the implications of a
massive coordinated attack have already been witnessed by the attacks of 9/11, it would be
irresponsible to claim that terrorists are unable to strike again with this same brute force, even
with our heightened security. Whittaker later states, “We all must now face the risk-picture
where there is a possibility of such a highly organized, mammoth terror event occurring again”
(Whittaker 161). If there is one thing that America has learned from the attacks on 9/11 it is that
terrorists are not always unreliable, unskilled, madmen but in many cases are very clever and
attune to the present day political landscape.
While physical threats continue to emerge the threat of a cyber-based attack grows more
imminent. These attacks are presently occurring everyday with very little public knowledge and
attention. Dan Verton writes, “There are tens of millions of people currently on the internet. If
only a small fraction of these individuals have the necessary skills and training to launch
destructive attacks this means […] thousands of individuals have such capabilities” (Verton IX).
Verton goes on to state, “To date [2003], more than 50,000 computer viruses have been created,
and up to 400 are active at any one time” (Verton IX). Not to complicate this issue further is the
fact that while our physical infrastructure is aging we are relying more and more on SCADA
systems that are linked to networks that can be exposed by skilled hackers and terrorists. While
some assume that computer hackers are only interested in defacing government websites and
stealing credit card numbers Maura Conway in her article, What is Cyberterrorism?, states, “in a
briefing in late 2002, FBI assistant director Ronald Dick […] told reporters that hijackers had
used the internet, and used it well” (Conway). This means that in early 2001 Al-Qaeda terrorists
were already prepared to exploit the internet’s vulnerabilities and use it to cause the most
devastating terrorist attack ever committed on U.S. soil. Andrew Colarik, author of Cyber
Terrorism, writes, “The loss of statewide power grids, the contamination or disruption of water
grids, or the deliberate opening of a dams flood waters are but additional targets that have been
penetrated in the past, and may in the future be employed by cyber terrorists to cause harm”
(Colarik 52). In an interview with me he states, “Al-Qaeda and other low level terrorist
organizations are prepared to exploit our cyber infrastructures vulnerabilities today” (Colarik).
Defining Infrastructure

If one is going to tackle the issue of infrastructure security they must first be prepared to
give a rather precise definition to what exactly infrastructure is. For this I turn to The MerriamWebster Dictionary which defines infrastructure as “a system of public works in a government,
state or region” (“Infrastructure”). While this definition allows for a very broad characterization
of infrastructure it still leaves much to be desired. A more thorough definition leads us to the
1996 Presidential Directive 131010 which defines infrastructure as,
The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising
identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and
distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and
services essential to the defense and economic security of the United
States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society as a
whole (Gheorghe 5).
While this definition is more thorough than the one found in Merriam-Webster yet it is still
unable to truly define and outline all that the term infrastructure entails and represents. When I
spoke with Andrew Colarik on the matter of defining infrastructure he told me that infrastructure
was a broad term that must be all encompassing and is therefore in effect useless (Colarik). One
may ask why it is so important to specifically define the word infrastructure and the answer is
that for policies to be implemented properly to secure vital pieces of our country’s public and
private infrastructure one must be able to understand the true scope of all that the word
infrastructure represents so that they may take the correct action may be taken. However, a vital
road block to more thoroughly defining infrastructure lie with the ever changing physical and
political environment that we live in. In a congressional research report released in 2004,
commenting on the evolution of the term infrastructure, it stated, “Twenty years ago
infrastructure was defined primarily with respect to the adequacy of the nation’s public works. In
the mid 1990’s, however, the growing threat of international terrorism led policymakers to
reconsider the word infrastructure in the terms of homeland security” (Motiff). This evolution of
the term infrastructure with its inclusion of homeland security practices created a need for a
definition of critical infrastructure. Over the past few years it has become more and more clear
that we rarely deal in terms of infrastructure but rather deal in terms of critical infrastructure.
However, this beefed up rhetoric has not made its way to producing actual results when in 2005
the American Society of Civil Engineers gave America’s overall infrastructure a grade of D and
proposed that it would take 1.6 trillion dollars over the next five years to get all sectors of
infrastructure working in good condition (“2005 Report Card for America's Infrastructure”)
To define critical infrastructure I turn to the 2001 Patriot Act which states,
systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters
(Sensenbrenner).
In an interview with Dan Verton I asked him how he would define critical infrastructure and he
replied, “Critical infrastructure is any piece of our infrastructure that could directly affect our
nation’s security and stability, therefore it is everything” (Verton). For the origins of the term
critical infrastructure I turn to Ted G. Lewis, an expert on SCADA systems, who writes, “The
term critical infrastructure did not exist before the 1990’s. Then, from 1997 through 2003, the

definition of what constituted a critical infrastructure expanded from 8 to 13 sectors plus five key
assets. Today it is difficult to identify sectors of the national economy that are not critical”
(Lewis 29). One may ask why the term critical infrastructure has become so all encompassing.
The answer to this is because we live in a society where all people are connected through a host
of infrastructure whether it is a wireless cell phone grid, electrical power grid, water management
services, internet use and so on. If one of these infrastructures were to be attacked there would be
instability throughout a broad area rather than just localized effects. In a 2002 book by the
Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism it states, “The openness and
efficiency of our key infrastructures transportation, information and telecommunications
systems, health systems, the electric power grid, emergency response units, food and water
supplies, and others make them susceptible to terrorist attacks” (Albert’s). This presumes that we
are no longer a nation that can thwart off the effects of a localized attack on our nation’s
infrastructure because all the crucial components that make up critical infrastructure are
susceptible and in effect networked.
Another division in the definition of infrastructure was the development of internet
technologies and their expanded influence throughout the late 1980’s through the present day.
The 2003 National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace states, “By 2003, our economy and national
security became fully dependent upon information technology and the information infrastructure.
A network of networks directly supports the operation of all sectors of our economy…”
(Cyberspace Threats and Vulnerabilities). The strategy further stated that the “healthy
functioning of cyberspace is essential to our economy and national security” (Cyberspace
Threats and Vulnerabilities). Even more terrifying, John Arquilla, a terrorism expert, told me
during an interview that Al-Qaeda was gaining key victories in terms of cyber warfare such as
engineers and experts in the field of information technology (Arquilla). In today’s world AlQaeda can gain victories not only through terrifying suicide bombs and calculated terrorist
attacks but also through inexpensive cyber warfare where costly and in some cases life
threatening terror can be waged. When I spoke with Dan Verton on the issue of cyber terrorism
and the effect it could pose to our economy and our infrastructure he referred to what we saw in
2001 with the week long shut down of Wall Street after 9/11 and the large ramifications that we
saw in the business world because of the extended technological failures. He also told me that a
prolonged shut down of Wall Street could pose a more than devastating effect on the U.S.
economy than many suspect and could ultimately bring some sectors of our economy to their
knees. The reason for this increasing insecurity and instability in the cyber world exists because
“The U.S. has developed and implemented infrastructure that is more dependent on electronics,
advanced telecommunications, energy supply systems…and transportation systems more than
any other nation” (Maggio). Internet technologies (IT) are cost effective and are seen as a way to
increase productivity and efficiency with little focus put on systematic security. Many terrorism
experts believe cyber vulnerability “is the Achilles heel in which a good attack can disrupt
everything that is connected in a massive scale” (Maggio). To make matters worse, 85% of our
infrastructure is owned privately and there has been a lack of government-private party
engagement in the field of cyber security, much of our infrastructure lay in the hands of CEO’s
who see no reward for their investment in security measures except for their own job security.
Robert Graham, CEO of Errata Security, stated, “It’s an industry in denial. They don’t believe
they have security problems that they have. It’s not a technical issue, but a political one”
(Higgins). This inaction cannot be blamed however on lack of knowledge of the threat. In a study
by Trusted Network Technologies in 2006 50 IT CEO’s from mid size electrical and gas

companies were asked about their cyber preparedness and their sense of the true threat that cyber
terrorists pose. In a response to the statement asking about the future threat that online attackers
pose to our critical electrical infrastructure, 40% of the respondents were neutral about the idea
and 33% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that systems could be compromised
in the next 24 months (Walker). Knowledge of this is scary for many IT security personnel who
believe that security is lacking to the extent that there are hundreds of open and firewall free
networks waiting for terrorist sabotage that could cripple or severely damage vital pieces of our
nation’s critical infrastructure. In an alarming report by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) in 2007 it stated,
With 85 percent of the country’s critical infrastructure in private hands,
the federal government must make sure that the 17 infrastructure sectors
include cyber security in their plans to protect themselves against cyber
attacks and disaster…However, none of the sectors included in their sector
plans all 30 cyber security criteria, such as key vulnerabilities and
measures to reduce them, the official also testified (Mosquera).
The harsh reality of the situation is that we will continue to invest and create new technologies
that ever more bind the vital core of our infrastructure and soon create an infrastructure that is so
interconnected the threat of terrorism no longer lays in a crowded city street but rather thousands
of miles away through a key board and a mouse. As I was told in an interview with John
Arquilla, “Distance is no longer a factor for terrorist across the world” (Arquilla).
Data and Methods
When I began my study on cyber terrorism and its impact on SCADA systems and
infrastructure security I hypothesized that the threat posed by cyber terrorists was so grave that
our nation was in critical danger. However, from my study I can conclude that while there is a
great cyber threat there are also positive safeguards being put in place to hinder their clever and
ever evolving opponents. However I can also conclude from my research that many sponsors of
the government describe the problem as much less pressing than those involved in research and
homeland security. I came to this conclusion with the use of in-person and telephone interviews,
government testimony and other research tools.
The first portion of my data came from interviews with 10 government and private
security specialists ranging from a government house representative, a senator, to data security
specialists within the field of homeland security. These interviews spanned from September 15,
2007 through November 9, 2007 and each interview lasted approximately 15-50 minutes and was
recorded with a mini-cassette recorder for future reference. To prepare for these interviews I
researched the participant and then in a conversational manner discussed the issue of
infrastructure security, vulnerability, and preparedness.
I also attended a security seminar, Operation Weblock, in Jacksonville, FL on October
18-19, 2007. Here representatives from the private and government sector spoke about the risks
that are posed by cyber terrorists and how companies can better safeguard themselves from a
devastating attack. It was at this seminar that I spoke with Dan Verton, a highly acclaimed
investigative journalist and consultant for the government with cyber security affairs. I also met
with cyber security experts from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and learned of the
policies that are being put in place to help secure Florida’s online and physical infrastructure.
Lastly I consulted thousands of pages of text on a range of issues from cyber security,
process control systems, SCADA systems, government effectiveness, and private company

responsibility. I used research databases provided by the University of North Florida and also
gathered useful information from the local library system. I reviewed congressional testimony
ranging from 2001 to 2007 on the issue of cyber security and infrastructure vulnerability. Dr.
Ted G. Lewis, a researcher at the naval postgraduate school, also sent me helpful online links
regarding the risk of cyber threats and the potential for a devastating attack on America’s
infrastructure and ultimately its citizens. From these sources I was able to create an exhaustive
study of the issue of cyber terrorism and the serious threat it poses to our nation’s infrastructure.
Results: The State of Our Infrastructure
With an ill prepared private sector and a government sector that is unwilling to truly
regulate and stop the misuses and ignorance of powerful CEO’s we are continuing down a path
of inevitable failure. Through my research I have come to understand the misguided partnership
that the government and the private sector have created over the past ten critical years. With
most of the utility, wastewater management, and oil companies owned privately, cost effective
business practices have led companies to implement systems such as SCADA into unsecured
networks. Ultimately, the low cost of the internet has caused owners of critical infrastructure to
implement patchwork security that could ultimately pose real threats to our economy and our
citizen’s lives.
Until recently, SCADA systems were often used in a reactive manner to
identify system faults as they occurred, recording system data and events
for later analysis. With escalating demands on businesses for increased
efficiency, SCADA systems have been re-architected to now include data
management functionality that prevents problems, rather than recording
them. Unfortunately, the security of SCADA systems is lacking, due to the
narrow focus on using the systems for increased productivity, reliability
and greater operating efficiencies (“SCADA: Get the Facts”).
With much of our country becoming more and more technology driven a case can be
made that security has taken a back seat to economic expansion. In an article by Security Focus it
states,
The electric power industry is perhaps the most obvious target, because
the electric utilities are major users of sensor and control networks. Nearly
1,700 of the 3,200 power utilities have some sort of SCADA system in
place, according to a recent survey by industry researcher Newton-Evans.
Almost a quarter of companies with SCADA systems did not have a
firewall separating the control network from the corporate network,
leaving the systems open to attack from the Internet. In addition, only 40
percent of power utilities with such networks bothered to keep detailed
access and network-data logs, according to Newton-Evans (Lemos).
In an article entitled, “The Threat of Electronic Warfare 2007”, it stated, “It is the Achilles heal
in which a good attack can disrupt everything that is connected in a massive scale” (Maggio).
We see this same pattern when in an interview with John Arquilla I was told that because of the
networking of our infrastructure critical nodes around the country are being created that could be
damaged in the cyber or physical realm. In one article Robert Graham, CEO of Errata Security,
stated, “It's an industry in denial. They don't believe they have the security problems they have.
It's not a technical issue, but a political issue…Until there's a Pearl Harbor; there is no risk as far

as they are concerned” (Higgins). This is very telling because in an interview with Dan Verton
he confirmed the belief that until there is a cyber Pearl Harbor the government will do little in the
way of regulation. In 2003 Sandia National Laboratories released a report on SCADA security
and concluded that, “The present state of security for SCADA is not commensurate with the
threat or potential consequence” (Stamp). In an interview with Ted G. Lewis stated, the
“problem is extensive and it would be hard for anyone to deny that” (Lewis). As you can see the
threat that we face is very ominous and if not taken seriously and dealt with carefully and
efficiently we as the most powerful country in the world could be brought to our knees with a
metaphorical click of the mouse.
While much of this criticism applies to the private sector the government is in no position
to preach about security. In an interview with Senator Bill Nelson he stated, “We are not moving
in the right direction when it comes to cyber security and critical infrastructure protection”
(Nelson). In another interview with Representative John Mica he stated, “The government must
do more to create interaction within the public-private sectors” (Mica). However like in most
grave instances where action is decisively needed many still profess that we are more secure than
security officials are willing to claim because there has not been an attack that truly caused
physical harm to civilians. While lives have yet to be lost one can pinpoint many instances that
cyber attacks have taken place with financial costs reaching unimaginable heights and also
reasonable scenarios that would appear to have the capacity to cause the loss of life. In a report
about cyber attacks in 2003 top SCADA and cyber security officials concluded that the lack of
data on cyber attacks is the reason for some of the industries complaints. In a 2002 article
entitled Debunking the Threat to Water Utilities, it stated, “Most public utilities rely on a highly
customized SCADA system. No two are the same, so hacking requires specific knowledge”
(Byres). The problem with this logic is it lacks the research to truly reach its conclusion. If one
were going to examine the industry of water utilities they would find that much of the substations
that comprise the system are imported and the software that the system is run on is imported as
well. This would negate the argument that specific knowledge would be needed to harness an
attack because that knowledge lay with those outside the company and outside the country. In an
interview with SCADA security expert Eric Byres he stated that the importation of critical and
sensitive systems pose a real and dangerous threat. Also it is well known that SCADA software
is in clear text on the internet and someone with a background in engineering coupled with
computer software skills could cause a wide range of problems for any security system. Also
more damning to this argument is the fact that while in 2000 the FBI reported that 71% of
security breaches were carried out by insiders, or disgruntled employees who were familiar with
the systems, that number has begun to dramatically change and in 2003 it was reported that 90%
of security breaches originate outside the company (Byres). This leads one to believe that
systems are either becoming friendlier to users that are unaware of company protocols or cyber
terrorists are becoming more rampant and more skilled. “Regardless of the reasons, the threat
sources are moving from internal to external and this needs to be taken into consideration in the
risk assessment process” (Byres).
While the government has been very active over the last ten years when it comes to
protecting critical infrastructure it is unclear as to how successful their attempts have been. In
1998 President Clinton signed PDD 63 which identified the various critical infrastructures and
the need to protect them. What then followed were measures such as the 2001 Patriot Act and the
2003 Plan to Secure Cyber Space. While these measures coupled with increased congressional
testimony have stirred up Washington and layed the foundation for the understanding of the

critical problem we face it is very clear that little improvement has been made. The most recent
set of government guidelines came from the National Electrical Reliability Corporation (NERC).
These guidelines include specific steps that companies must take to better secure their systems
from a cyber attack. In an interview with Stan Johnson, spokesperson for NERC, I was told that
the standards would be tough and while implementation would raise costs for electrical
companies the guidelines were achievable and could prove to be very effective (Johnson). With
these 83 guidelines coupled with the regulations under the Sarabaes-Oxlety Act (SOX) the need
for increased cost effective practices may come to wreck more havoc on security (Walker). In an
article by Trusted Network Technologies it stated, “Compliance also diminishes resources and
diverts them form other important projects” (Walker). These policies however are ultimately a
step in the right direction because they are enforceable and display that the government has the
courage to take on electrical companies if it is what’s needed to secure that vital core of our
critical infrastructure. Later in my interview with Stan Johnson he stated, “We are going to
implement policies that will require increased costs on security measures by companies and that
is ok” (Johnson).
While government standards are a step in the right direction many experts have called on
all industries, including the government, to map out a plan that would allow for assistance and
response in the event of an attack. In a report by News Report it stated,
Our nation's Internet and cyber infrastructure serve as a critical backbone
for the exchange of information vital to our security and our economy, but
our analysis has exposed a significant weakness that could paralyze the
economy following a disaster… If there's a cyber disaster, there is no
emergency number to call -- and no one in place to respond because our
nation simply doesn't have the kind of coordinated plan in place that we
need to restart and restore the Internet," Rust added. "Government
and industry must work together to beef up our cyber-security and
recovery efforts” (“Analysis Warns U.S. of Cyber Security Weaknesses”).
This is a very telling argument because it calls into question why our government seems to be so
focused on emergency preparedness, as was outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, and yet little of the National Cyber Security Divisions budget is set for cyber recovery. Yet
this question also leads us to the inquiry of government funding. In an article by the National
Journal’s Technology Daily in 2007, it stated that the budget for the department’s cyber division
was close to the same as the previous year and this was unacceptable. It further stated, “It is
certainly a good sign that the president has requested $65.5 billion in IT spending across federal
agencies agencies…But when you look at a breakdown of the percentages, specifically for
[Homeland Security], the 1.1 percent decrease from last year is very concerning” (Greenfield).
This issue also arose when I spoke with Sam Varnado, of Sandia National Laboratories, and was
told that many of the agencies that are commissioned for cyber security are under funded and are
lacking many necessary resources. He later when on to state, “If we are going to give true focus
to the implementation of correct SCADA security measures programs must be funded that can
create the necessary technologies” (Varnado). This is very concerning when one considers that as
technology progresses the problem of cyber vulnerability within critical infrastructure will just
become more and more dynamic and imposing. Again while many advances are being made
within the government spectrum the change is not happening at a rate that could cause anyone to
believe that we are headed for a more secure infrastructure. One key to securing our critical

infrastructure and our SCADA systems are providing effective policies for companies to follow
that will provide for higher security. However as Eric Byres told me in my interview, “The
government beurocrats continue to put out specific point plans that are neither possible to
implement and knowingly not cost effective” (Byres). This would lead one to believe that the
government is interested in a strategy that is not so much concerned about security but rather a
plan that does not leave the government as the fall guy. To finally display the threat that cyber
terrorists pose to our critical infrastructure I turn to an article by Trusted Technologies, which
spoke with 50 IT executives of Utility companies around the country, came to the conclusion that
“Utilities clearly recognizes the threat—and don’t just consider but expect an outside attack on
critical SCADA and energy distribution systems” (Higgins). This alarming conclusion comes
from the discovery that “one third of IT executives surveyed believed that some SCADA or
distributions systems would be attacked or compromised in the next two years” (Higgins). In the
end my results concur with beliefs of Dan Verton who relayed to me in my interview that the
government cannot be relied on to secure our cyber infrastructure but yet we must turn to
partnerships of private business executives, IT experts and government officials for one to even
scratch the surface.
Implications and Conclusion
From my interviews with government officials and security personnel I can conclude that
the government since early 2002 has been studying the threats that the cyber world has on our
critical infrastructure very heavily. This can be seen from the increase in congressional reports
and increased congressional testimony being given by the leaders in cyber security on Capitol
Hill. However, with over 85% of our infrastructure being owned privately and many turning to
the internet for increased efficiency and lower costs it seems as though we are at critical point in
the world of cyber security where the entire infrastructure could soon be so robust there would be
no turning back the years of lacking security protocols. When I spoke with John Arquilla on the
subject of government action he stated that while there has been much progress made in
Washington “they cannot be relied on to secure the systems of the entire nation” (Arquilla). Sam
Varnado presented to me that a major problem associated with government is funding for
institutional research in the field of cyber security. With respect to the IT Homeland Security
budget for the 2008 fiscal year “the Bush budget proposal requests 179 million for departmentwide IT expenses. That would be down 90 million from the 2007 budget” (Greenfield). This
report prompted Liesyl Franz, a budget analyst, to respond, “With it’s mission and increased
expectations that is insufficient” (Greenfield). While the government may be spending billions of
dollars to prevent a serious cyber attack one could present evidence that shows that the
plutocracy that the government has created has led to a place where a cyber emergency
bureaucracy has no 911 number to call for help. Edward Rust proclaims “If there’s a cyber
disaster, there is no emergency number to call—and no one in place to respond because our
nation simply doesn’t have that kind of coordinated plan in place…” (“Business Roundtable
Issues Warning”). An example of this would be the National Cyber Security Division’s funding
is targeted for support of cyber recovery. From my research I have found that there is a true
consensus around the entire business and government community that the threat of cyber attack
is real and will only progressively become more problematic as the country moves more critical
systems to the vulnerable internet. In the end one can turn to the Journal of Counterterrorism and
Homeland Security for the answer on our cyber preparedness when they state, “The U.S. has
developed and implemented infrastructure that is more dependent on electronics, advanced

telecommunications, energy supply systems, information/computer networks, and transportation
systems more than other foreign nations” (Maggio).
My results indicate that the threat of a cyber attack on the critical infrastructure of the
United States is a real and ongoing threat. My three main findings conclude that the United
States government, while aware of the threat, is not acting accordingly. The emergency
preparedness programs that the government has set up for are not sufficient enough to combat a
cyber attack, and also the highest of executives in the energy, academic, and security sectors
believe that the threat of a cyber or physical attack on our critical infrastructure is not only real
but imminent. From my research I have collected sufficient evidence to conclude that the
infrastructure of the United States is progressing in a manner that will continually combat the
forces of regulation and leave much of our most critical infrastructure vulnerable to either a
physical or a cyber attack that could result in billions of dollars in losses as well as the loss of
lives. When I spoke with Dan Verton about the state of our infrastructure protection he stated,
“Companies are waiting for the electronic Pearl Harbor or a cyber attack comparable to hurricane
Katrina before they truly enact policies that promote real security and secure their systems”
(Verton).
While my research outlined the inaction of the government and the overall threat that of a
cyber attack on our critical infrastructure more needs to be done to truly combat the problem.
Laboratories that are funded by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy are
constantly producing terrifying reports about the state of our SCADA system security and also
the vulnerabilities of our physical infrastructure to cyber attack. However many of these reports
findings do not make their way into company security audits. I believe that Capital Hill is taking
the correct action by giving the floor to cyber experts so that action can be taken for the most
desperate of needs. One of the major steps that need to be taken is to outline the beurocracy of
the cyber security community more thoroughly and outline the duties of the different
departments so that information sharing can take place in the most efficient manner. With the
United States becoming more dependent on insecure technologies and the reality that powerful
CEO’s are unwilling to sacrifice cost efficiency for security, the problem of cyber security will
become more jumbled and will soon, if no action is taken, become too much for an
interconnected system of unsecured parts to truly overhaul, and protect.
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